The Brandeis Legacy*

HONORABLE MARY MURPHY SCHROEDER**

Louis Brandeis was the greatest lawyer of the early twentieth century,
and perhaps of the entire century. He was brilliant, driven, charismatic,
and absolutely devoted to improving the lives of the common people of
the United States. Put in more contemporary terms, he was committed
to the notion that technological and economic advances should not
widen the gap between the haves and the have-nots. His causes were the
environment, citizenship, freedom of expression, quality of life in the
workplace, protection against increasing power wielded by large
corporations, and protection of individual privacy. All were issues that
emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century and that are still with
us today.
It would be appropriate for any occasion to look back one hundred
years to see just what has happened to the causes he championed; but
that is not the real reason why I chose Brandeis and his causes as my
topic. I chose this topic because I knew and loved Nat Nathenson, and
Nat was a clerk for Louis Brandeis.
Nat was my very own link to the immortals: those men, and alas they

were all men, who articulated and shaped the way we think about the
law today. Nat was a colleague of my husband when he visited Arizona
State University. I now realize that I had a professor or two who had
known Brandeis on a professional level, but Nat was someone I could
more closely relate to as a contemporary and a colleague. He had
twinkling eyes and an unprepossessing air that told you right away he
was kind and smart. I met Nat before my own children were born, or at
least before they had gotten very far along in Mother Goose, so I
*
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thoroughly discounted the effects of both nature and nurture in Nat's
personality. I credited all of Nat's charm, wit, and intelligence to Louis
Brandeis. I now offer my inadequate and belated apologies to Nat's
parents.
There is a bust of Justice Brandeis in one of the beautifully paneled
formal rooms of the Supreme Court. It is unforgettable for the angles
that define the profile and for the intensity that shines forth from the
eyes. I once asked Nat whether that intense light was really there. He
responded, "Oh yes, always." I have since checked out all of the
photographs, drawings, and caricatures of Brandeis I could over the
years, and that intensity is always there. It is the visible manifestation of
the greatest legal mind of the past one hundred years.
So let me begin with some of the things we should know about
Brandeis as we look back on his work a century later. Though he
practiced law in Boston, Brandeis was not a Brahman. He was not even
from the East Coast; he was from Kentucky. And although he did not
have a religious upbringing, his family was Jewish. Brandeis is
identified with Zionism, but that was very much a product of his life
experiences, not his birthright.1 His brain was what we would call
photographic. One famous letter from a classmate at Harvard Law
School deserves quotation here. Brandeis
[i]s supposed to know everything and to have it always in mind. The professors
listen to his opinion with the greatest deference. And it is generally correct.
There are traditions of his omniscience floating through the school. One I heard
yesterday. A man last year lost his notebook of Agency lectures. He hunted
long and found nothing. His friends said: 'Go and ask Brandeis-he knows
everything-perhaps he will know where your book is.' He went and asked.
Said Brandeis, 'Yes, go into the auditors' room, and look on the west side of the

room, on
the sill of the second window, and you will find your book.' And it
2
was so.

It is said that as a Justice on the Supreme Court, Brandeis did not

engage in the customary reading of his opinions. He spoke them from
memory, and the newspaper reporters played a game of following along
to see if he ever made any mistakes. He rarely did.
Brandeis was not an ideologue. He had no ingrained commitment to
one cause that he carried forward from puberty. His sensitivity to social
problems never wavered, but his solutions-how the law should address
those problems-changed as society and his perceptions changed. For
example, he thought the common law-the courts' incremental
adaptation to change-would take care of the welfare of industrial
workers-until he witnessed the cruelty of U.S. Steel during the great
1.
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Homestead Steel strike, which convinced him that the state needed to
regulate industrial working conditions. Brandeis thought that women
should be cared for and coddled-until the suffrage movement made
him a true believer.* He was no doubt nudged by his own two
daughters--one an economist and one a lawyer.
Brandeis invented public interest law. By representing wealthy
interests, he was a millionaire while still in his forties. But he never had
a corporation on retainer as a client; he never accepted money for public
service work.
Brandeis also invented the phrase "the curse of bigness," and he

fought concentration of economic power and its effects all of his life
His style was to teach by marshaling facts, not theories. He invented the
so-called "Brandeis brief' as a way to present data and information to
the court. He supported, as in his most famous case, Muller v. Oregon,8
the efforts of states to deal with terrible conditions in the work place.
To study how business treated other businesses, he helped create the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) on behalf of the Wilson
administration.9 The FTC was first to study and then to regulate anticompetitive trade practices by big business.'0 Brandeis ended his career
on the Supreme Court by striking down New Deal legislation, some of
which was in many ways ill conceived and all of which Brandeis may
have feared as foreshadowing the ultimate curse of bigness-the federal
government." He was, as I learned from Nat Nathenson and gleaned
from all of the writings of those who knew him, profoundly respected by
those who were fortunate enough to have worked closely with him.
Brandeis was a man with regular habits. He retired at ten p.m. and
3. See id. at 87, 141-42.
4. See id. at 422-23.
5. See Phillippa Strum, The Unlikely Radical, AM. LAw., Dec. 1999, at 43.
6. See MASON, supra note 1, at 92-93.
7. See Louis D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF
Louis D. BRANDEIS (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1934).
8. 208 U.S. 412,421 (1908).
9. See MASON, supra note 1, at 402-04.
10. See id. at 402-03.
11. See generally, Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(striking down the Live Poultry Code, which regulated hours and wages of Brooklynarea slaughterhouse workers); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S.
555 (1935) (voiding the Frazier-Lemke Act, which provided bankrupt farmers with
alternatives to mortgage foreclosure); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S.
602 (1935) (holding that the Presidential power to remove executive officers does not
allow removal of members of the Federal Trade Commission).

rose at four-thirty a.m., ate lunch at the same places and never had to
worry about domestic burdens. He was driven to the office while he
read the2 papers, he broke for lunch at one, and came home at six for
dinner.
Any ranking would put Brandeis among the top lawyers and judges of
the century. The American Lawyer recently listed and profiled in
alphabetical order the top one hundred lawyers of the twentieth century,
which included, apart from Brandeis, prominent litigators, such as
Melvin Belli and Clarence Darrow; presidential advisors, such as Elihu
Root; judges, such as Hugo Black, Benjamin Cardozo, and Oliver
Wendell Holmes; founding fathers of firms like Paul Cravath and

William Nelson Cromwell; and pioneers who spoke out for great causes
of human and civil rights, such as Thurgood Marshall, Telford Taylor,
and Ralph Nader. 3 A remarkable thing about Brandeis is that he did all
of these things. If one looks at the American Lawyer's list of the one
hundred great lawyers, perhaps the closest to Brandeis, as a Renaissance
lawyer, is Thurman Arnold, founder of the great firm of Arnold &
Porter, advisor to presidents, and a fine judge. But Thurman Arnold
never made it to the Supreme Court.
Let me explain in another way what it is that to me makes Brandeis
greater than the other greats. Today's law students are taught, or
otherwise receive from the legal environment of today's law schools and
law firms, that when they become lawyers, they will have to make a
choice. They can serve the public interest or they can get rich. They
cannot do both. Brandeis did both. He got rich working for millionaires
so that he could spend his time pursuing the legal issues that affect
people's lives. It was not a mere personality quirk that drove him never
to take on a corporation as a permanent client. That was the secret of his
ability to maintain his integrity. He never sold out to the devil by
creating a permanent conflict of interest between the public interest and
the interest of a single corporation or industry that was his client. It is
doubtful that anyone would or could do that today, with the ascendancy
of the curse of bigness Brandeis fought.
Here I want to make a kind of modest assessment of how some of
Brandeis's most noble crusades fared over the course of the century-to
cut through the aura of haze that surrounds legends and assess the
Brandeis legacy in practical terms. I am going to try to do that by taking
two areas of legal development that were nascent in Brandeis's day and
to which he greatly contributed as lawyer and judge: the law of antitrust
and the law of privacy. First, what did Brandeis see as the social
12.
13.
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problem the law should address in each area? Second, how does the law
of today envision and address the same problem? Finally, I will look at
what we generally consider to be Brandeis's greatest gift to legal
method-the art of persuasion through facts and data, instead of dogma
and doctine-and consider to what extent it has remained alive and well.
I turn first to antitrust law. Brandeis helped pass the Sherman Act and
the Clayton Act, which today remain the principal embodiments of
national antitrust policy. These acts are very vague statutes, and they
have expanded and contracted over the years much like doctrines of
constitutional law. Brandeis believed that the antitrust laws were more
about ethics and equality than efficiency. He was greatly concerned
about small competitors and the way they were treated in the
marketplace. He saw the concentration of power in the hands of the few
as unfairly choking off opportunity for the many. He was also
concerned with social and political effects because he considered the

concentration of power to be anti-democratic.
Brandeis's view was that corporations needed to be regulated to
prevent them from becoming too large. The best expression of this view
is Brandeis's dissenting opinion in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee.'4 In
Liggett, the Supreme Court held that Florida's graduated tax on
corporations, which increased according to the number of stores a
particular corporation operated, failed the rational basis test and thus
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5
Justice Brandeis dissented, arguing that the law did not create an
arbitrary distinction, but rather discriminated on the reasonable basis that
larger corporations constitute a greater social and political menace than
smaller ones. 16
Brandeis compared large corporations to a "Frankenstein monster"'7
and commented on large corporations' anti-democratic nature." He
wrote:
The changes thereby wrought [by increases in corporate size] in the lives of the
workers, of the owners and of the general public, are so fundamental and farreaching as to lead... scholars to compare the evolving "corporate system"
with the feudal system; and to lead other men of insight and experience to assert

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

288 U.S. 517 (1933).
See id. at 533-38.
See id. at 541-80 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 567.
See id. at 565.

that this "master institution of civilised [sic] life" is committing it to the rule of
a plutocracy. 19

Brandeis endorsed what he believed to be the chief aim of the Florida

statute: the protection of mom-and-pop stores. Florida's citizens
may have believed that the chain store, by furthering the concentration of
wealth and of power and by promoting absentee ownership, is thwarting
American ideals; that it is making impossible equality of opportunity; that it is
converting independent tradesmen into clerks; and that it is sapping the
resources, the vigor and the hope of the smaller cities and towns.2

His concluding paragraph is a particularly strident rallying cry against
the danger of permitting large corporations to choke off economic
opportunity for the masses. Note the Brandeis style of contrasting the
big corporations with the small individual over and over again in one

lengthy sentence to link the preservation of small competitors with the
maintenance of liberty.
There is a widespread belief that the existing unemployment is the result, in
large part, of the gross inequality in the distribution of wealth and income which
giant corporations have fostered; that by the control which the few have exerted
through giant corporations, individual initiative and effort are being paralyzed,
creative power impaired and human happiness lessened; that the true prosperity
of our past came not from big business, but through the courage, the energy and
the resourcefulness of small men; that only by releasing from corporate control
the faculties of the unknown many, only by reopening to them the opportunities
for leadership, can confidence in our future be restored and the existing misery

be overcome; and that only through participation by the many in the
responsibilities and determinations of business, can Americans secure the moral
and intellectual development which is essential to the maintenance of liberty.21

In Liggett, Brandeis also recognized the growing laissez-faire attitude
that has shaped our contemporary antitrust view. He saw what was

coming-the notion that bigness is the price to be paid for corporate
efficiency.
Today our antitrust debate is fueled by the views of Chicago school

theorists like Robert Bork, author of The Antitrust Paradox.2 Bork's

book rails against "activist" judges like Brandeis who believed that the
Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts were intended
to guarantee a balance of economic power even when such a balance
would be inefficient.2 For Bork, efficiency and its attendant cost and
price reductions are the only goals of the antitrust laws. If a practice

19.
20.
21.

22.
(1993).
23.
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does not increase price or create inefficiencies, it should not be
condemned.
This efficiency theory is the dominant understanding in antitrust law
today, as evidenced by the now-familiar mantra that the antitrust laws
protect "competition, not competitors."24 In Brooke Group v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., Bork himself successfully defended a
cigarette company against an antitrust action brought by a competitor. 2
The competitor argued that below-cost pricing hurt smaller
competitors. 26 The Supreme Court firmly rejected that position, stating
that the fact that "below-cost pricing may impose painful losses on its
target is of no moment to the antitrust laws if competition is not
injured."27 Brandeis would have strongly disagreed.
Brandeis thought that the antitrust laws were motivated by society's
belief "that the great trusts had acquired their power, in the main,
through destroying or overreaching their weaker rivals by resort to unfair
practices."2 Brandeis focused not on members of society as consumers,
but on members of society as market participants. Professor Zacharias
has observed that this view of the antitrust laws stemmed from
Brandeis's desire "to infuse corporate activity with the same values that
the market had represented in the writing of nineteenth century social
theorists, emphasizing goals not only of competition, efficiency and
growth, but also of equality, fairness and individual autonomy."29 In his
article, Professor Zacharias responds to the contention made by theorists,
such as Bork, that Brandeis somehow just did not get it when it came to

economics?

Professor Zacharias explains that Brandeis in fact

understood that combination and concentration could sometimes create
economic utility.3 It was social utility-social efficiency, as Brandeis
called it-with which Brandeis was most concerned.' 2 Brandeis felt that
there is a "law of ethics that man shall not advance his own interests by
exploiting his weaker fellows or through casting burdens upon the
24. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 U.S. 209, 224
(1993) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
25. See id. at 211 (noting Robert H. Bork, Washington, D.C., for respondent).
26. See id. at 223.
27. Id. at 224.
28. FrC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421,434 (1920) (Brandeis & Clarke, JJ.,
dissenting).
29. L.S. Zacharias, Repaving the Brandeis Way: The Decline of Developmental
Property,82 Nw. U. L. REv. 596, 603 (1988).

30.

See id. at 598-99.

31.
32.

See id. at 626.
See id. at 630.
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community.

33

Scholars agree that this concern with the social effects of wealth
concentration and the "fair play" aspect of the antitrust law has largely
died out. The FTC, the agency that Brandeis helped to create in order to
police "unfair competition," now rarely targets immoral or unethical
conduct between competitors, as Professor Robert Lande has observed in
an article questioning the efficiency theory.'M Professor David Millon
has written that "[tihe normative assumptions of the Sherman Act,
grounded ultimately in eighteenth century ideas about the importance of
balanced economic power in a democratic society, seem to have
collapsed."3
If the question is whether Brandeis's view of antitrust ought to be
revived today, and for what purpose, the answer might have something
to do with the role of regulation. Brandeis's emphasis on fair play led
him to view agencies, the FTC in particular, as referees rather than
enforcers. In this period of deregulatory fervor, perhaps agencies might
still retain this general element of oversight. Rather than letting the
Microsofts of the world run wild before stepping in and taking them
apart, an agency in the Brandeis model would be, as Brandeis said in his
dissent in Gratz, "ever vigilant,"3 6 and would prevent unfair practices
rather than waiting for an effect on price or output. That is the legacy
Brandeis would have wanted.
Let us turn to the right of privacy. Brandeis's legendary prescience in
this area extends from his very early grasp of the discomfort and
embarrassment the then-nascent technology of communications could
bring to people whose lives came to the attention of the press, whether
they were persons of talent or social position, or victims of tragedy. It
all began, of course, with the 1890 HarvardLaw Review article entitled
"The Right to Privacy" that Brandeis wrote with his friend Samuel
Warren, encapsulating the concept in the phrase the right "to be let
alone."37 Ironically, Brandeis did not invent that phrase. But Brandeis

was able to use it memorably, first in the article, and then in his famous

dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States.38
For Warren and Brandeis, writing in 1890, the enemy was the press.
33.

BRANDEIS,

supra note 7, at 56.

34. See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Originaland Primary Concern
of Antitrust: The Efficiency InterpretationChallenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 117 (1982-

1983).
35.

David Millon, The ShennanAct and the Balance of Power,61 S.
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1219, 1291 (1988).
36. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S.421,435 (1920) (Brandeis & Clarke, JJ., dissenting).
37. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Htv.L.

REV. 193, 193 (1890-1891).
38.
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They said:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and
of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and the vicious, but has
become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy
a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the
columns of the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is
filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the
domestic circle. The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing

civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man,
under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity,
so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual; but
modem enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy,
subjected him to mental
pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by
39
mere bodily injury.

Early on, as the protector of this right to privacy, Brandeis looked to
the common law: the development in state courts of the laws of
nuisance, defamation, and property. Warren and Brandeis both looked
to the English common law for their seminal case, the case of Prince
Albert v. Strange.40 The English court held that a common law of
property and copyright protected the privacy interests of Queen Victoria
and Prince Albert in their artistic hobbies.' The court barred a writer
from even describing the etchings created by the royal pair.42 Warren
and Brandeis both wanted to protect everyone from the public
dissemination of essentially private information.
The notion has great appeal and great moral force. No one likes
peeping toms or gossip mongers. What happened? The Warren and
Brandeis right to privacy collided with the First Amendment. The
problem for the courts-and here I greatly oversimplify so please bear
with me-was how to distinguish between what was genuinely
newsworthy information and information that should remain private.
The courts have never been able to distinguish between the two. In the
landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan4 3 the Supreme Court
enunciated the famous principle that the First Amendment freedom of
the press means that information about a public figure, even if it is false
or libelous, is not actionable in tort, absent a showing of actual malice.

Commentators in discussing the ascendancy of the First Amendment
39.
40.
41.

Warren & Brandeis, supranote 37, at 196.
41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (Ch. 1849).
See id. at 1178.

42. See id.
43.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

over the Brandeis vision are mournful, adopting titles such as Diane
Zimmerman's "Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Tort,"" and an article by my own much-loved First
Amendment Professor, Harry Kalven, entitled "Privacy in Tort LawWere Warren and Brandeis Wrong? 45
When Brandeis penned his dissent in Olmstead," the enemy for
Brandeis was no longer the press, but the government. In Olmstead,
Brandeis described "the right to be let alone" as "the right most valued

by civilized men.'" 7 These words, or a citation to them, have managed to
find their way into all the important privacy cases of the twentieth
century.
Olmstead involved wiretapping and whether it violated the Fourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures or
the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination. 4" The
majority held that wiretapping was constitutional. 49 It said that there
could be no Fourth Amendment violation because there was no search
and no seizure of anything. 50 There was hearing and only hearing."
Thus, there could be no violation of self-incrimination either.12 The
statements were all voluntarily made without force, violence, or threat,
so there was no constitutional violation. 3
Brandeis's dissent said, in essence, that times have changed.m The
Constitution must protect from today's threats. He pointed out that
when the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were enacted, force and
violence were the only means by which the government could compel
self-incrimination or secure private papers.55 Now "[s]ubtler and more
far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the
Government. '6 In almost prophetic language, Brandeis foresaw the
technological advances we have today when he commented that "[tihe
progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of
espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day
44. Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis'sPrivacyTort, 68 CoRNELLL. REv. 291 (1983).
45. Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?,
31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 326 (1966).
46. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 478.
See id. at 455.
See id. at 462, 466.
See id. at 464.
See id.
See id. at 462.
See id.
See id. at 472-74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See id. at 473.
Id.
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be developed by which the Government ... will be enabled to expose to
a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home."57
The dissent's style is important. Brandeis did not directly criticize the
majority. Rather, the criticism indirectly suggested that the weight of
authority supported his view and that the language of the amendments
should be construed in light of their purpose, not their literal meaning.
Quoting an earlier Supreme Court case, he said, "[t]he narrow language
of the Amendment has been consistently construed in the light of its
object .... The privilege. .". is as broad as the mischief against which it

seeks to guard.""

Here again, as with his view of the antitrust laws,

Brandeis is looking to the law to provide general principles that must
adapt to the social and technological changes of the time. Again, as with
the antitrust laws and every other field, experience and facts should
triumph over outmoded doctrine. That is the key to Brandeis's
intellectual legacy.
Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead is significant to yet another part of his
legacy. He picked his battles carefully. He knew which issues mattered.
The dissent is so evocative of danger, so filled with references to
principles long established, yet so accurate in its forecast of scientific
advancement, that it has been enormously influential. Even though
many appellate judges today disagree with Brandeis's conclusion in
Olmstead, and though I speak today only for myself, I know nearly all of
us would like to make a statement that is so important.
Finally, what about Brandeis's method of advocacy and elucidation
symbolized by the so-called Brandeis brief? It supported contentions by
relying not on traditional legal arguments, case law or legal writings, but
on empirical data and legislative findings. The technique worked well in
the Muller case itself, upholding an Oregon statute regulating hours
worked by women.59 Not only did Brandeis's side prevail, but the court
in its opinion both discussed the brief and approved its method, stating
"[w]e take judicial cognizance of all matters of general knowledge."'
There are many high-profile examples of Supreme Court opinions
written in the tradition of Brandeis's brief in Muller. Two of the most
significant decisions, of course, are Brown v. Board of Educatiot 1 and
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 477 (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892)).
See Muller, 208 U.S. at 416 (1908).

60.

Id. at 421.

61.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

Roe v. Wade. 2 In Brown, the Court supported its conclusion that
segregation generates a feeling of inferiority among African-Americans
by citing several social science publications. 3 And in Roe, the Court
relied on several medical, religious, and scholarly sources while
discussing the safety of abortions at different stages of pregnancy, fetal
viability, and religious and medical beliefs regarding the beginning of
life.6' Yet the use of data in those opinions has been questioned, and
many jurists frown on use of such data today. Justice Scalia has stated
that "socioscientific, ethicoscientific, or even purely scientific evidence
is not an available weapon."' Justice Thomas has also made clear his

dislike of judicial reliance on social science or empirical data, stating
"[t]he lower courts should not be swayed by the easy answers of social
science, nor should they accept the findings, and the assumptions, of
sociology and psychology at the price of constitutional principle." '
There are, however, examples of fairly recent Supreme Court opinions
that seem to follow in the Brandeis tradition. During the late 1980s, the
Court acknowledged the role of empirical research in judicial decision
making in death penalty cases. The Court's opinion in Thompson v.
Oklahoma1 is a good example. In holding that executing a defendant
who was fifteen years old at the time he committed a murder violated the
Eighth Amendment, Justice Stevens relied exhaustively on data very
similar to that set forth in Brandeis's Muller brief-statutory schemes
from various states, foreign death penalty laws, and learned treatises that
discussed our experience with the death penalty.6 Interestingly, even the
concurring and dissenting justices recognized the significance of those
data on the outcome of the case, differing primarily in how they viewed
the data.
In Lee v. Weisman," a fragmented Court held that religious prayers
conducted at public school graduations, in which even objecting students
were induced to participate, violated the Establishment Clause."
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy relied upon three articles from
psychological journals for the proposition that "adolescents are often
susceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity, and that the
influence is strongest in matters of social convention."' Justice Scalia,
62.
63.
64.
65.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Roe, 347 U.S. at 494n.11.
See Brown, 410 U.S. at 149, 160-61.
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989) (Scalia, J., separate opinion).

66.
67.

concurring).
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 122-23 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
487 U.S. 815 (1988).

68.

See id. at 824-38.

69.

505 U.S. 577 (1992).

70. See id. at 599.
71. Id.at 593-94.
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in his dissent, criticized the majority's reliance on such authority,

seeming even to mock it at times.72 In sum, he called the decision a
'
The battle is thus being fought today in the
"jurisprudential disaster."73
Supreme Court over what is, in essence, Brandeis's legacy: judicial
adaptation of the law to technological and intellectual change.
Finally, a word about the Brandeis method as it relates to judicial style
and relations. Because Justice Brandeis believed very much in
persuading his audience of the correctness of his position, he did not
spend much time in his opinions tearing down the position of the other
side. He did not attack the conduct of his colleagues or adversaries. He
believed all people are worthy of respect as human beings. Let us hope
that this legacy will not die out in the courts of this great nation.

72.
73.

See id. at 637-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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